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Historical Justice, Nationhood  and African Americans 
Simon Guertin‐Armstrong* 
I will, in the name of humanity which is outraged, in the name of liberty which 
is fettered, in the name of the constitution and the Bible, which are disregarded 
and trampled upon, dare to call in question and to denounce, with all the 
emphasis I can command, everything that serves to perpetuate slavery — the great 
sin and shame of America ! 
- Frederick Douglass1 
Abstract 
The intelligibility of historical justice is linked to matters of agency and causation. 
This article presents an account of historical justice limited to transgenerational 
collective agents which is immune to the agency and causation problems affecting 
traditional theories of diachronic justice. The novel theory is applied to the case of 
African Americans, to whom no reparations for past wrongs have been made up 
to now. When conceived as a transgenerational collective agent – i.e. as a nation–, 
the African Americans are shown to be owed reparations by the American polity. 
These reparations are deemed necessary to the goal of reconciliation and to the 
establishment of relations of mutual respect, which are construed as preconditions 
to effective distributive justice, here and now. 
______________ 
* L’auteur est étudiant à la maîtrise en philosophie à l’Université de Montréal. 
Il tient à remercier Dominique Leydet pour ses commentaires judicieux, tant 
sur le fond que la forme de l’argument, formulés dans le cadre du séminaire 
de recherche en philosophie politique et du droit « Histoire et 
responsabilité : la justice réparatrice », ainsi qu’un évaluateur anonyme dont 
les commentaires ont été tout autant appréciés. Cette recherche a été 
financée par le CRSH (766-2011-0236) ainsi que par le FQRSC. 
1 Excerpt from the speech What to the Slave is the Fourth of July? (1852). 
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Why repair past wrongs and past injustices? Polities have limited 
resources and numerous demanding contemporary moral stakes: 
distributive justice, climate justice, penal and criminal justice, only to 
name a few. According to John Torpey, the “end of History2” 
explains the recent spur of interest in reparation projects: when the 
future offers no prospect of significant change, there is a temptation 
to turn back to the past in order to make whole what has been 
smashed3. Independently from this contingent historical conjuncture, 
one might argue that reparations are justified for they aim to rebuild 
mutual trust and mutual recognition relationships deemed necessary 
to distributive justice, hic & nunc4. 
However, the project of reparative justice faces important 
theoretical problems. For example, is it reasonable to sanction agents 
for their forbearers’ deeds simply because they are their descendants; 
or is it likewise reasonable to compensate agents for harms that were 
inflicted to their forbearers? It is generally accepted that identifying 
victims of past injustices and theirs descendants as well as 
perpetrators and their descendants is a necessary first step to attribute 
rights to and obligations of reparation5. In many cases however, it is 
difficult to assert that harm is effectively transferred from the victim 
to its descendants. So serious is this difficulty that in some cases past 
injustices might be superseded by the mere passage of time; and thus, 
they become inadequate to ground rights to or obligations of 
reparation6. 
There might nonetheless be a general exception to this problem. 
When past injustices involve transgenerational collective agents which 
have an ontological identity spanning centuries, rather than mere 
______________ 
2 Fukuyama, F. (2006), The End of History and The Last Man. 
3 Torpey, J. (2006), Making Whole What Has Been Smashed. On Reparations 
Politics. 
4 Wenar, L. (2006), “Reparations for the Future”. 
5 Waldron, J. (1992), “Superseding Historic Injustice” ; Sher, G. (1980), 
“Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights” ; Kukathas, C. (2006), “Who ? 
Whom ? Reparations and the Problem of Agency” ; Simmons, J. A. (2000), 
“Historical Rights and Fair Shares”. 
6 Waldron, J. (1992), “Superseding Historic Injustice” ; Sher, G. (1980), 
“Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights” ; Kukathas, C. (2006), “Who ? 
Whom ? Reparations and the Problem of Agency”. 
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individuals agents or aggregates of individuals, then the identity of 
victim and perpetrator are no longer in doubt. Attributing historical 
rights and obligations thus seems feasible. Janna Thompson offers in 
Taking Responsibility for the Past. Reparation and Historical Justice an 
obligation-based account of historical justice which limits its scope to 
transgenerational collective agents. According to Thompson, 
historical obligations derive from the moral practice of making 
promises as well as from the respect due to nations on the basis of 
their primary collective right to internal self-determination. However, 
her theory presents a number of difficulties. 
In this paper, I aim to present a plausible account of a theory of 
historical justice limited to transgenerational collective agents. First, I 
will briefly sketch a typology of collective agents in order to point out 
the descriptive inaccuracy and circularity in Thompson’s argument 
and to ascertain the concept of a transgenerational collective agent. 
Second, I will offer an account of national historical responsibility 
grounded on the former typology of collective agents and on David 
Miller’s convincing argument for extending moral responsibility to 
nations as collective agents rather than to states7. Third, I will 
contend that African Americans are a nation, and that the theory of 
historical justice limited to transgenerational collective agents 
presented in this paper can help us assess historical rights and 
obligations relative to the many wrongs perpetrated against them. 
Fourth and last, I will list plausible reparations which could be owed to 
the African American nation by the American nation, recognizing 
that reparations are first and foremost a political process and thus 
refraining from any definitive assertion. This stance allows the 
argument to remain within the proper boundaries of a philosophical 
investigation on political matters. 
1. Transgenerational Collective Agents 
To fully grasp the value as well as the limits of Thompson’s 
interesting argument for an obligation-based account of historical 
justice, fundamental issues of social ontology must be addressed. To 
understand what exactly transgenerational collective agents are, one 
must first understand what collective agents are, and how they can 
______________ 
7 Miller, D. (2007), National Responsibility and Global Justice. 
Simon Guertin‐Armstrong 
 26 
properly be considered moral agents, capable of contracting rights 
and obligations through the exercise of collective agency. It is also 
necessary to clarify how historical injustices are to be distinguished 
from common, non-historical injustices. 
The temporal dimension of  responsibility seems at first glance to 
be a new parameter which must be accounted for in order to 
understand the specificity of  historical justice as a theoretical 
endeavor. However, responsibility is always responsibility for past 
actions, inactions and omissions, whether they originate from an 
individual or a collective agent: there is a non-zero timespan between 
the action, inaction or omission which causes harm, the voicing of  a 
demand for reparation, and eventually the reparation itself  as 
processed by the judiciary. The criterion used to distinguish between 
“normal” justice and historical justice cannot therefore be the 
timespan itself, unless it is possible to specify a difference of  kind – 
and not of  degree – between one year and ten, a hundred, or four 
hundred years – which seems rather unpromising. The sole other 
plausible candidate is the ontological permanence of  agents. Whereas 
normal justice has for scope the competing claims about rights and 
obligations of  actual agents, historical justice encompasses claims 
about rights and obligations related to the deeds of  deceased persons. 
Actions, however, are not only performed by individual agents, 
but also by collective agents. Tracy Isaacs identifies four types of  
collectives: the organization, the goal-oriented group, the aggregate 
and the random aggregate8. The random aggregate is a mere 
collection of  individuals. The aggregate is a collection of  individuals 
which share one or many common characteristics. The goal-oriented 
collective is a group of  individuals which may share one or many 
goals, and whose functioning rules are variable:  
[…] a goal-oriented collective is a collective whose 
members come together around the achievement of  a 
particular goal. That goal might be long or short term. Its 
achievement may involve considerable planning or virtually 
______________ 
8 Isaacs, T. (2011), Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, p. 24-28. 
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none. The collective might have many members or just 
two9.  
Lastly, the organization is a group of  individuals endowed with a 
formal structure, which establishes a hierarchy by distributing roles, 
obligations and prerogatives, states a purpose and entrenches 
procedures for decision-making and acting10. Of  these four types of  
collectives, only the organization and the goal-oriented collective 
qualify as collective agents. Following a standard definition, three 
phenomena mark the ontological emergence of  collective agents and 
distinguish them from their constitutive elements: collective agents 
accomplish deeds distinct from their individual members’ 
(performance); collective agents survive the change in cast of  their 
individual members (permanence); certain acts done by individual 
members are only intelligible by reference to the collective agent 
(reference)11. 
Organizations and goal-oriented collectives are collective agents 
because of their decision-making structure which allows for the 
formation of collective intentions. This intentional capacity grounds 
these collectives’ capacity for collective action. It also constitutes 
them as collective moral agents, morally responsible whether they act 
or not: omission and inaction are as liable to moral evaluation as 
action12. 
Which type of collective agent is Janna Thompson referring to in 
her argument? She conceives the transgenerational collective agent as 
something which symbolically survives the succession of generations 
of constituting members. For two generations to be distinct in 
Thompson’s sense, they must be mutually exclusive: the first 
generation13 has necessarily vanished if the second is to exist. 
Individual generations are considered as agents rather than the 
______________ 
9 Isaacs, T. (2011), Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, p. 32. 
10 Ibid., p. 28. 
11 Cripps, E. (2011), “Collectivities without Intentions”, p. 1. 
12 Isaacs, T. (2011), Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, p. 27-28. 
13 Here, “generation” is not conceived as the demographic unit of the cohort, 
which refers to any group of individuals born within the same 20-years-or-so 
timespan. Thompson uses the concept of generation to refer to all the 
members of a given nation who are alive at any specific t moment. 
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transgenerational collective itself: Thompson’s conception thus 
reduces transgenerational collective agents to symbolic bonds 
between generations, rather than construing the collective as an 
ontologically distinct social entity. 
This conception is descriptively inaccurate. As David Miller 
astutely remarks, the idea of succeeding generations is a mind’s view; 
there is in fact a constant demographic flow of births and deaths 
which replaces over time entire populations14. The idea of relations 
between unrelated generations is thus also incoherent, but Thompson’s 
argument ultimately rests solely on this: the moral relation between 
generations. It is why she needs to invoke a principle, which links the 
moral responsibilities of otherwise unrelated generations, in order to 
respect the basic principle of justice which forbids to hold B 
responsible for A’s actions. Thompson mobilizes the “Aristotelian 
principle” to accomplish this linkage, because it commands what one 
might call diachronic reciprocity: even though two collective agents 
are not related because they do not exist in the same timespan, they 
share a symbolic characteristic (such as common nationhood or 
common faith) which acts as a bond commanding that the latter 
agent respects the promises made by the former agent on its behalf15. 
However, the validity of the Aristotelian principle is assumed rather 
than demonstrated, as remarks David Miller:  
Thompson’s argument […] depends on assuming what has 
to be shown, namely that later generations ought to honor 
the promises made by earlier generations. If that is 
assumed, then of course we will judge that our successors 
ought to keep any promises we make, and that we ought to 
keep the promises made by our predecessors. But no 
argument has been given for the assumption itself16. 
For this reason, the Aristotelian principle does not succeed in 
circumventing the problems of circularity and descriptive inaccuracy 
which plague the argument. However, they can be overcome if we 
______________ 
14 Miller, D. (2007), National Responsibility and Global Justice, p. 151. 
15 Thompson, J. (2002), Taking Reponsibility for The Past. Reparation and 
Historical Justice, p. 14-18. 
16 Miller, D. (2007), National Responsibility and Global Justice, p. 144-145. 
Historical Justice, Nationhood and African Americans 
  29 
abandon Thompson’s distinct generations’ account for an account of 
truly transgenerational collective agents: that is, collective agents 
whose identity remains stable despite changes of cast in their 
membership. Nations, I contend, are such agents. And when they are 
organized and capable of intentional collective action, they are – 
following Isaacs’s account of collective agency – morally responsible 
as nations for their past actions, inactions and omissions. 
2. National Historical Responsibility 
Proper justification must be provided for such a contention. First, 
how can a nation be considered a collective agent responsible for its 
collective actions, inactions and omissions? To be deemed morally 
responsible, a collective must be capable of intentional collective 
action: “collective moral responsibility requires that collectives be 
agents capable of intentional actions17”. Organizations and goal-
oriented collectives, as stated previously, have this capacity by virtue 
of their decision-making structure, whether it be formal or informal18. 
Can a nation be morally responsible according to this criterion? 
To answer this question, we must first agree on what a nation is. 
According to Michel Seymour, one can define a nation as a cultural, 
ethnical or political19 collective, which is regarded by its own 
members as a fundamental part of their personal and collective 
identity they wish to preserve20. This minimalist definition mobilizes 
objective and subjective elements and is thus apt to mobilize an 
enduring and large consensus21. As defined by Seymour, a nation 
______________ 
17 Isaacs, T. (2011), Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, p. 53. 
18 Ibid., p. 27. 
19 A nation has first and foremost a specific and distinct structure of culture, 
composed of a common public language, a common public history and 
common public institutions – irrespective of its cultural, ethnic or political 
nature (Seymour 2008, 32). 
20 Seymour, M. (2008), De la tolérance à la reconnaissance. Une théorie libérale des 
droits collectifs, p. 32. 
21 David Miller proposes a definition in five points which overlaps with most 
of Seymour’s definition (Miller, D. (2007), National Responsibility and Global 
Justice, p. 124-134). Seymour’s minimalist definition has an advantage over 
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approximates a goal-oriented collective whose minimal goal, 
notwithstanding numerous sociopolitical splits, is the preservation of 
the nation as one of the foundations of a shared collective identity 
and of a sense of belonging. Because of this goal, the nation cannot 
be reduced to a simple aggregate whose members share objective 
characteristics but lack a common purpose. However, such a minimal 
goal – even if shared by tens or hundreds of thousands – does not 
constitute a collective agent capable of intentional collective action. 
Nations thus seem to be limit cases in Isaacs’ typology of collectives: 
neither a mere aggregate, nor necessarily capable of intentional action, 
nations must err in the fringes of social ontology. 
Nations, however, can become capable of intentional collective 
action. To coordinate their many goals, to resolve internal conflicts 
and to levy the resources necessary for collective action, inter alia, 
some nations design, implement and use systematically formal 
decision-making structures. The state – or the government, for some 
non-sovereign nations – is the organization which allows the nation 
to act as a collective. One can thus distinguish between two social 
types of nations: organized nations, contingently capable of collective 
action; and unorganized nations, contingently incapable of collective 
action22. 
If the state is in normative democratic theory an instrument meant 
to serve the nation, it happens sometimes that the elite controlling 
the state apparatus is divorced from its nation’s common political 
good. The responsibility of the state and the responsibility of the 
nation must thus be distinguished, and the conditions that allow for a 
logical connection between the nation’s responsibility and the 
responsibility of its organization must be specified. According to 
Thompson, when a government is democratically elected, it can 
generally be considered a representative of its nation, and the nation 
can be considered responsible for its acts23. In other words, a nation 
is responsible for its political representatives and agents’ actions, 
                                                                                                 
Miller’s as it allows recognizing different types of nations and minority 
fragments of nations. 
22 This distinction will prove useful in latter stages of the argument. 
23 Thompson, J. (2002), Taking Reponsibility for The Past. Reparation and 
Historical Justice, p. 15. 
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inactions and omissions if it can be reasonably inferred that the 
nation authorized these actions, inactions and omissions through the 
political process. David Miller specifies more stringent conditions to 
hold nations responsible for its political representatives and agents’ 
deeds24. It does not suffice that co-nationals be duly represented in 
legislative and executive (where applicable) institutions, deliberation 
fora must also exist:  
Where nations are subject to outside rule, any ascription of 
national responsibility becomes problematic. The nation is 
governed in a certain way, but it does not act politically at all. 
[...] In the absence of a political forum in which national 
aims and values can be articulated and debated, it will be 
difficult to establish how far the population as a whole is 
implicated in support for the activities in question25.  
What is problematic is not outside rule per se, it is heteronomous 
rule: local political elite can govern as arbitrarily, if not more, than 
imperial elite dominating the nation. This case can be observed in 
dictatorial and totalitarian regimes where the endogenous political 
authority serves ends that are alien to the nation. A nation thus 
cannot be held responsible for the actions, inactions and omissions of 
heteronomous political elite, but it nonetheless has the obligation to 
constitute a counter-power to resist and oppose an arbitrary power26. 
Karl Jaspers’ grave sentence, written in the wake of the dissolution of 
the Nazi regime, can be understood this way: “a people answers for 
its polity27”. 
But can a national minority be held responsible for the deeds of 
the national majority28? According to Miller, because all members of 
the mono- or pluri-national polity share the benefits – though not 
necessarily equally – of social cooperation, they should also share the 
costs and obligations it brings forth. Two types of situations do 
______________ 
24 Miller, D. (2007), National Responsibility and Global Justice, p. 126-127. 
25 Ibid., p. 127, emphasis added. 
26 Locke, J. (1690), Traité du gouvernement civil, § 229-243. 
27 Jaspers, K. (1961), The Question of German Guilt, p. 61. 
28 This remark applies equally to dissidents of  a mononational polity 
(national minority) and to minority nations in a plurinational polity. 
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however invalidate the obligation of social solidarity: unfair 
distribution of benefits and burdens of cooperation29, and 
irreconcilable cultural or axiological differences between nations30. All 
in all, national responsibility appears to be a coherent concept. The 
validity of the national type of collective responsibility requires that a 
nation be organized, that its political regime be minimally democratic 
– by both representation and deliberation –, that benefits and 
burdens of cooperation be shared minimally fairly, and that cultural 
and axiological diversity be not so dire as to prevent the formation of 
a minimal consensus over political values. 
Second, what does it mean for a nation to be morally responsible? 
How does that differ from moral responsibility contracted as a member 
of a nation? What are the relations between collective and individual 
responsibility for transgenerational collective agents and their 
members? Tracy Isaacs distinguishes two levels of moral 
responsibility: collective moral responsibility, which is the moral 
responsibility of collective agents, and individual moral responsibility, 
which is the moral responsibility of individual agents, or physical 
persons. Individual moral responsibility for actions, inactions or 
omissions can be contracted either as a member of a collective agent 
or simply as an individual agent capable of intentional action. When a 
person acts as a member of a collective agent, he or she has the 
intention to participate to the collective action of this agent. The 
constraints and potentialities which circumscribe possible actions for 
individuals as members of collective agents delimit the scope of their 
moral responsibility. Distinguishing these two levels of moral 
responsibility makes it possible to think the moral responsibility of 
both the acting nation and the individual member, proportional to his 
or her individual authority, according to the position held within the 
functional structure of the organization. These two levels of moral 
responsibility are irreducible and sui generis31. 
______________ 
29 We can leave aside, for the sake of the present argument, the issue of what 
exactly a fair distribution is. 
30 Miller, D. (2007), National Responsibility and Global Justice, p. 130-133. 
31 The question of moral responsibility is distinct from legal responsibility; 
and thus the question of apportionment of sanctions does not need to be 
addressed here, however interesting it is. 
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If it satisfies the conditions enumerated supra, a nation is morally 
responsible for each and every action, inaction or omission of its 
members who have had, within the bounds of their duly authorized 
function, the intention to participate in the collective action. It would 
be nonsense to hold the nation responsible for the unauthorized acts 
of members to whom discretionary power was not ceded as a 
necessary prerogative to their functional role. Thus, when individuals 
accountable for blameful deeds committed within the rightful bounds 
of their official functions decease, it is only their personal moral 
responsibility which is superseded; the moral responsibility of the 
nation remains untouched. Nations as collective agents are thus 
permanently liable to moral obligations which derive from past 
wrongs, as long as the necessary reparations are not made or as long 
as the claimant does not declare the supersession of the wrongs. Or, 
as long as the responsible nation does not cease to exist, for that 
matter. As for the responsibility to repair, it befalls to the nation as a 
transgenerational collective agent and to the members of the nation 
which, in accordance with their official functions, are representatives 
of the acting nation in its relations to other nations32. 
3. The Africans Americans as a Nation 
Except for its use by the proponents of radical movements, the 
term “nationhood” is nowhere to be found in the literature on 
African Americans to designate them as a group, even in the 
literature produced by writers of African American descent. As the 
common public history and common public institutions of African 
Americans are well documented, this absence is striking but 
nonetheless understandable as the term “nation” has an exclusively 
patriotic denotation in the United States of America. One might 
hypothesize that the only legitimate national self-representation in 
______________ 
32 Miller’s argument is compatible with the argument presented here: “My 
claim is that one cannot legitimately enjoy such [national] benefits without at 
the same time acknowledging responsibility for aspects of the national past 
that have involved the unjust treatment of people inside or outside the 
national community itself, and liability to provide redress in whatever form 
the circumstances demand” (Miller, D. (2007), National Responsibility and 
Global Justice, p. 161). 
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America is mononational – that of being an American – and this 
precludes self-representation on the basis of another, supplementary 
nationality33. For this reason, African Americans do not demand 
recognition of their distinct nationality, that of Afro-americanity. The 
“melting pot” policy34 and ensuing ideology would thus be to blame 
for the skewed public self-representation of African Americans. In 
spite of this, African Americans do conceive themselves as distinct 
from Americans which are not the descendants of African slaves on 
the basis of history, language, culture and public institutions. The 
purpose of this section is to establish how and to what degree African 
Americans constitute a nation, notwithstanding nominal self-
representation to the contrary, and as such to prepare the discussion 
on reparations for past wrongs in the following section. 
The public common history of African Americans comprises 
many important past wrongs, starting with the transatlantic passage 
or deportation, continuing with slavery, de jure segregation under the 
Jim Crow regime and de facto segregation. Forever cut off from their 
native communities by deportation and also cut off from the rich 
Euro-American capitalist landowner society, American slaves of 
African descent or origin developed a distinct culture. In immediate 
proximity of Euro-American slaveholders and their employees, 
deported African slaves gradually adopted English as a common 
public language and Protestantism as a common public religion. 
African American Protestantism is a truly unique religion, in many 
ways different from the Euro-American version: it blends the 
doctrine of Protestantism with ritual elements from African 
spiritualities. Gospel songs – or negro spirituals – epitomize the 
original African American religious syncretism. According to 
Yourcenar, the negro spirituals embody a grand moment of human 
emotion, composed in profound grief and enlightened by elated 
hope35. 
Over time, African Americans developed various types of dance 
and music, a literary tradition and a culinary tradition absolutely novel 
______________ 
33 Even though diverse and plural ethnic self-representations are common. 
But more on this subject later. 
34 The American practice of cultural assimilation. 
35 Yourcenar, M. (1980), Les Yeux ouverts. Entretiens avec Mathieu Galey, p. 190-
191. 
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and distinct from similar cultural expressions of the society of 
European settlers and American landowners36. They were distinct in 
so many respects and so early in their history that the authors of the 
report A Common Destiny. Blacks and American Society, published in 
1989 by the Committee on the Status of African Americans of the 
Behavioral and Social Sciences Commission from National Research 
Council of the United States declare: “The world of black Americans 
has always been a part of American society, but the black and white 
worlds have also always been mostly separate. The inevitable 
consequences have been distinctive features of black culture and 
social organization37”. The central institution of this parallel society is 
the African American Church: 
Probably no other single institution has played such an 
important role in maintaining the cohesion of black society 
as the black church. As E. Franklin Frazier (1963:30) 
concluded: ‘An organized religious life became the chief 
means by which a structured or organized social life came 
into existence among the Negro masses’. The church was 
an agency of moral guidance and social control. It was also 
an organizational network that laid the foundation for 
mutual aid societies, developed much if not all the black 
community’s political leadership, and provided an impetus 
for educational advancement. The local church was often 
the center of black community life38. 
Research featured in the chapter on identity and institutions of the 
African American society of the report entitled A Common Destiny. 
Blacks and American Society not only assesses that African Americans 
believe they constitute a distinct nation, but also that they wish to 
preserve their distinct community – as it is necessary to their identity 
and self-representation39. Although these beliefs were reported for 
______________ 
36 Jaynes, G. D. and Williams Jr., R. M. (1989), A Common Destiny. Blacks and 
American Society, chap. 4. 
37 Ibid., p. 163. 
38 Ibid., p. 173-174. 
39 Ibid., p. 165. 
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the first time in 1922, it is reasonable to believe such sentiments were 
commonly held before: 
Overall, these findings suggest two main implications. 
First, most black Americans experience and attach 
importance to a group cultural identity. Second, an 
interwoven set of qualities – such as group cohesion, 
striving, and endurance – and a perceived need to continue 
to instill such qualities in future generations appear to be 
key elements of this cultural identity. To the extent that 
these orientations treat race as an important social 
characteristic, involve a sense of obligation to blacks, and 
indicate a commitment to overcoming group 
disadvantages, these patterns of cultural identity indicate a 
high degree of race consciousness among black 
Americans40. 
Following the definition of a nation as suggested by Michel 
Seymour, African Americans as a group constitute a cultural nation: 
they share a common language, a common set of public institutions 
and a common public history. They also wish to preserve their 
cultural distinctness and refer to their cultural group to define their 
personal identity. 
Black Americans must be distinguished from African Americans. 
To be a Black American, one only needs to be an American citizen 
and to have a dark complexion. To be an African American, one’s 
identity must be tied to the history of deportation, slavery and 
segregation, and to the distinct culture invented by the American 
black slaves and their descendants41. Based on this distinction, all 
African Americans are Black Americans but the converse is not true. 
According to the fourfold typology of collectives suggested by Isaacs, 
Black Americans are an aggregate of individuals which share a 
common objective trait – that is, a dark complexion. African 
______________ 
40 Jaynes, G. D. and Williams Jr., R. M. (1989), A Common Destiny. Blacks and 
American Society, p. 200. 
41 Descendants of African slaves in the Caribbeans have different languages 
and different cultures, and this makes them of a different national kind than 
descendants of African slaves in the United States of America. 
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Americans share much more, including the minimal goal to sustain 
the community from which they derive a sense of personal and 
collective identity. However, is it possible to distinguish in practice – 
not just conceptually – between Black Americans who also are 
African Americans and those who are not? It is an important matter, 
necessary to assess the feasibility of possible reparations for historical 
wrongs, knowing that in the year 2000 more than one Black 
American out of twenty was a first- or second-generation 
immigrant42. Fortunately, it is possible to identify the descendants of 
African American slaves because black immigration was close to nil 
between the end of the slave trade in the United States in 1808 and 
the adoption of the Immigration and Nationality Act which liberalized 
immigration policy in 1965 : 
Among the peoples entering the United States after 1965 
were millions of men and women of African descent. Prior 
to that date, the number of black people of foreign birth 
residing in the United States was so tiny as to nearly 
invisible. According to the 1960 census, the proportion 
was a fraction somewhere far to the right of the decimal 
point. Demographers, noting the small number of Africans 
arrivals between the closing of the slave trade in 1808 and 
the immigration reform of 1965, declared black America a 
closed population, the product of a century and a half of 
natural increase43. 
Being a descendant of American black slaves is a characteristic 
which could be used as a convenient proxy to identify members of 
the African American cultural nation. However, as a matter of fact 
some black immigrants might come to identify themselves with the 
African American language, culture, history and institutions; so much 
so that their (possibly pluri-) national identity would in fact reflect 
this sense of belonging44. Because the African American nation is a 
______________ 
42 Berlin, I. (2010), The Making of African America: The Four Great Migrations, 
p. 7. 
43 Ibid., p. 6. 
44 As is the case with the American President presently in office, Barack 
Obama. 
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cultural nation, this integration of migrants is not precluded logically 
– as would be the case for a nation founded on an ethnic basis. 
In philosophical literature, the national status of African 
Americans is a matter of controversy45: according to many authors, 
descendants of American black slaves do not constitute a nation. For 
the present argument, I will only discuss Janna Thompson’s position 
on this matter. Surprisingly, Thompson does not offer arguments to 
support the claim that African Americans do not constitute a 
nation46. If it is true that the African American nation was first 
created during and by slavery, then it is also true that this (relatively) 
new nation has no legitimate claims over unjustly dispossessed 
hypothetical property titles such as land or material goods. What 
African Americans were deprived of is the freedom and respect of 
dignity owed to them as persons and as a nation. Even though the 
racist supremacist ideology of the colonial era is in complete 
opposition with the contemporary universalist conception of human 
rights and rights of nations, it is the latter that must inform our 
understanding of the wrongs committed and of the reparations owed 
(if any). Inasmuch as the goal of historical justice is to make 
reparations for the future, enabling mutual trust to flourish again, we 
are justified in taking such a stance. The African American nation has 
never been an organized nation, but as a nation nonetheless it has 
had from the start the status of a collective moral agent and, as such, 
it has been a source of valid moral claims. Such a transgenerational 
agent cannot contract historical obligations due to its inability to form 
collective intentions and to act from them, but it deserves respect all 
the same and it can on this basis have historical rights and make 
reparation claims. The distinction between organized and 
______________ 
45 A related problem has to do with the intelligibility of the demands for 
reparation which are voiced by agents who are constituted by the injustices 
themselves. See for example Kukathas (Kukathas, C. (2006), « Who? Whom? 
Reparations and the Problem of Agency »), second footnote. There is no 
need to assess the validity of the claim according to which agent A cannot 
demand rectification of an injustice if this very injustice is a necessary cause 
of agent A’s being. It is sufficient, I believe, to remark that African 
Americans were victims of a succession of distinct injustices. 
46 Thompson, J. (2002), Taking Reponsibility for The Past. Reparation and 
Historical Justice, p. 130. 
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unorganized nations allows accounting for the effects of inequalities 
wrought by historical domination. Nations sometimes exist on 
symbolic, cultural and/or identity grounds, without also translating 
into the creation of autonomous political institutions capable of 
articulating demands for institutional recognition of the right to 
internal self-determination – notably because of a common history 
composed of a succession of injustices. Theories of reparative and 
historical justice should be sensitive to phenomena of domination, 
such as the one African Americans suffered from, from the very start 
of their journey as a nation47. 
If the African American nation is a real social entity, it appears 
that the discourse of a mononational American society is only but a 
myth. A myth that is not innocent, as it serves to cover assimilation 
and exclusion goals under the veil of tradition, universality and 
patriotism. In fact, African Americans are still largely excluded in the 
distribution of American wealth : 
[T]he great gulf that existed between black and white 
Americans in 1939 has only been narrowed; it has not 
closed. One of three blacks still live in households with 
incomes below the poverty line. Even more blacks live in 
areas where ineffective schools, high rates of dependence 
on pubic assistance, severe problems of crime and drug 
use, and low and declining employment prevail. Race 
relations, as they affect the lives of inhabitants of these 
areas, differ considerably from black-white relations 
involving middle-class blacks. Lower status blacks have 
less access to desegregated schools, neighborhoods, and 
other institutions and public facilities. Their interactions 
with whites frequently emphasize their subordinate status 
______________ 
47 It is worth noting that the case of African Americans points to some limits 
of rights-based theories of historical justice: because they are constituted as a 
nation out of slavery, African Americans have no rightful claim to property 
titles, and to restitution thereof. Any enhancement of their socio-economic 
and civic status is thus to be understood as a net gain, according to the 
rights-based theories – not as betterment which results in an obligation to 
repair historical injustices. 
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– as low-skilled employees, public agency clients, and 
marginally performing pupils48. 
By almost all aggregate statistical measures – incomes and 
livings standards; health and life expectancy; educational, 
occupational and residential opportunities; political and 
social participation – the well-being of both blacks and 
whites has advanced greatly over the past five decades. By 
almost all the same indicators, blacks remain substantially 
behind white. [However, since] the early 1970s, the 
economic status of blacks relative to whites has, on 
average, stagnated or deteriorated49. 
Any attempt to assert a non-American national identity (even not 
as an exclusive national identity) is to be considered un-American. 
For this reason, a large majority of African Americans claim an 
American national identity, as well as an African American identity 
which expresses itself as a cultural or racial50 identity, even though it 
has all the aspects of a national identity. 
Americans are wrong in considering themselves as a 
mononational polity. They rather constitute a plurinational society, 
comprised of a majority nation of descendants of European settlers, 
an African American minority nation, Native Indian minority nations, 
as well as various immigrant communities, more or less assimilated 
into the majority nation. Reparations to African Americans as a 
nation for past wrongs brought unto them seem highly unlikely in the 
face of inadequate collective self-representation of Americans. 
Changing this perception is thus the first practical challenge for those 
aiming to make whole what has been smashed. 
4. Reparations and the African American Nation 
The claim that African Americans are not a nation does not resist 
scrutiny. It either hangs on a lack of relevant knowledge about 
______________ 
48 Jaynes, G. D. and Williams Jr., R. M. (1989), A Common Destiny. Blacks and 
American Society, p. 3. 
49 Ibid., p. 6. 
50 In the United States, the epithet racial has no pejorative connotation: it 
has the meaning of “ethnic”. 
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African Americans, or on a conception of nationhood that is too 
strict and thus blind to the effects of historical domination. Now, 
what are the reparations due to African Americans? Before we tackle 
this question, we must first clarify why reparations can be owed to 
unorganized nations, incapable of intentional collective action. 
First, is it possible to consider without incoherence a moral 
relation between a nation which is morally responsible – because of 
its collective agency, being capable of intentional collective action by 
virtue of its organization – and a nation which is not morally 
responsible? Janna Thompson’s theory allows for such asymmetry 
between transgenerational collective agents who can contract 
historical moral obligations and those who can make reparations 
claims based on historical moral rights51. Agents who contract 
reparation obligations must necessarily be capable of intentional 
collective action: they had to have this capacity in the first place in 
order to commit past actions, inactions or omissions; they must again 
have this capacity in order to be morally liable to reparations. As for 
agents who are victims of past injustices, it is not necessary that they 
be capable of intentional collective action to claim52 reparations. 
What matters is that this agent exists, not that it acts, which is 
sufficient to be considered worthy of respect. Barring few 
qualifications. 
Thompson suggests that nations must be minimally democratic 
and must honor their promises to be worthy of respect53. Respect is 
thus conditional on a specific type of organization and on a behavior 
deemed civil. There is however a more fundamental sense in which 
nations are worthy of respect: any nation, democratic or not, 
organized or not, has a fundamental collective right to internal self-
determination54 in recognition of its inherent dignity as a free and 
______________ 
51 Thompson, J. (2002), Taking Reponsibility for The Past. Reparation and 
Historical Justice, p. 146. 
52 To the exception that the delegation of legitimate representatives 
empowered to make such claim on the behalf of the nation, requires a 
nation to be minimally organized. More on that in the concluding section. 
53 Thompson, J. (2002), Taking Reponsibility for The Past. Reparation and 
Historical Justice, p. 33. 
54 Moore, M. (2001), The Ethics of Nationalism; Buchanan, A. (2003), Justice, 
Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law; 
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autonomous moral collective agent. Non-democratic nations are 
worthy of this same respect on the condition that they themselves 
respect the inherent dignity of all its citizens as free moral agents55, 
according to John Rawls56. His conception has the merit of balancing 
a minimum of universal respect for persons with liberal tolerance for 
cultural and axiological diversity. Thus, except for tyrannical or 
belligerent nations, every nation is worthy of respect. 
Unorganized nations cannot be considered collective moral 
agents57, but are nonetheless worthy of respect. They could be 
considered as moral patients, that is to say moral entities in respect of 
which moral obligations can be contracted, even though they cannot 
have reciprocal obligations due to their incapacity to neither act, nor 
deliberate. Traditional categories of moral patients are, inter alia, 
children, mentally impaired persons, senile persons and non-human 
animals. Now, there seems to be a case for adding for-the-time-
being-unorganized nations. 
Second, what are the justifications for the reparation itself? From 
the very start, we stressed that human, administrative and financial 
resources are insufficient to provide reparation for every historical 
injustice, and that they also are mobilized for the pressing needs of 
diverse stakes of contemporary justice. Why, then, repair historical 
injustices? Many authors claim that reparations essentially serve 
reconciliation58. According to Thompson, reconciliation aims to 
reestablish relations of mutual trust and respect: 
 
 
                                                                                                 
Seymour, M. (2008), De la tolérance à la reconnaissance. Une théorie libérale des 
droits collectifs. 
55 Specific conditions are not of interest here, but they can be found at pages 
59-88 in Rawls, J. (1999), The Law of Peoples. 
56 Rawls, J. (1999), The Law of Peoples. 
57 This is not to say that they cannot be considered as agents whom the 
moral law commands in the Kantian sense, but that they cannot be 
considered capable of relational moral agency. 
58 Goodin, R. (2012), On Settling; Thompson, J. (2002), Taking Reponsibility for 
The Past. Reparation and Historical Justice; Wenar, L. (2006), “Reparations for 
the Future”. 
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[R]econciliation is achieved when the harm done by 
injustice to relations of respect and trust that ought to exist 
between individuals or nations has been repaired or 
compensated for by the perpetrator in such a way that this 
harm is no longer regarded as standing in the way of 
establishing or re-establishing these relations. An act or 
process of reconciliation that accomplishes this objective 
counts as a just reconciliation. Victims are not obliged or 
entitled to regard reconciliation as just unless their just 
demands are satisfied […]59. 
If the reparation process sometimes demands restitution – partial 
or total – of heirloom property – such as the land of Native 
American tribes, rich with symbolic meaning –, it is not a necessary 
condition of all reconciliations. Leif Wenar astutely notes that the 
modalities of reconciliation are variable, according to the context and 
the agents involved:  
Because these forward-looking reasons for reparations are 
based in the value of improving relations, they can support 
whatever reparative policies are appropriate to the 
particular context. What matters in reparations is what 
works, and what it means for such reparations to work is 
that they will help to build trust from now on60.  
For this reason, philosophers and political theorists can only but 
suggest forms of reparations more or less plausible, shedding the 
pretension of identifying necessary and sufficient conditions of 
reconciliation; the agents involved are deciding together what the 
modalities of a “just” reconciliation are. This paper’s argument thus 
assumes a political conception of historical justice. 
The African American nation case suggests two types of symbolic 
reparations which seem almost necessary to reconciliation. Due to 
their symbolic nature, these reparations cost almost nothing and 
might be seen by African Americans as necessary proofs of bona fide 
______________ 
59 Thompson, J. (2002), Taking Reponsibility for The Past. Reparation and 
Historical Justice, p. 50. 
60 Wenar, L. (2006), “Reparations for the Future”, p. 405. 
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from the majority American nation to (re)establish mutual trust and 
guarantee public recognition of their collective dignity. The first 
symbolic reparation owed to the African American nation would be 
the public proclamation of official apologies on the behalf of the 
majority American nation, for the wrongs perpetrated during slavery, 
segregation de jure and segregation de facto. The second symbolic 
reparation would be the re-writing of a common public history to 
which both Americans and African Americans can agree as conveying 
all relevant experiences and events. As Randall Robinson underlines 
forcefully, though African Americans contributed massively to the 
development of the newly independent United States of America as 
slaves, nowhere is this contribution acknowledged. In this respect, 
the case of the Capitol monument is particularly telling: 
I thought, then, what a fitting metaphor the Capitol 
Rotunda was for America’s racial sorrows. In the 
magnificence of its boast, in the tragedy of its truth, in the 
effrontery of its deceit. […] This was the house of Liberty, and 
it had been built by slaves. Their backs had ached under its 
massive stones. Their lungs had clogged with its mortar 
dust. Their bodies had wilted under its heavy load-bearing 
timbers. They had been paid only by the coin of pain. 
Slavery lay across American history like a monstrous 
cleaving sword, but the Capitol of the United States 
steadfastly refused to divulge its complicity, or even 
slavery’s very occurrence. It gave full lie to its own gold-
spun half-truth. It shrank from simple honesty. It mocked 
the shining eyes of the innocent. It kept all of us – black, 
brown, white – the chance to begin again as co-owners of 
a national democratic idea. It has blinded us all of our past 
and, with the same stroke, to any common future61. 
Other possible reparations, more or less plausible, add to the 
proclamation of official apologies and the rewriting of a common 
history. First, the African American nation could demand monetary 
______________ 
61 Robinson, R. (2000), The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks, p. 6, emphasis 
added. 
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compensations62 for centuries of domination, economic (as well as 
sexual) exploitation, and brutal and cruel treatment. Whichever the 
form these compensations might take – whether as payments to 
individuals, to families, to communities, or as national or local 
dedicated trusts –, it is important to consider the paying capacity of 
the American polity. In a reconciliation perspective, a demand of 
monetary compensation cannot be morally valid if it threatens the 
capacity of the plurinational society to pursue economic 
cooperation63. How then can we estimate a plausible amount owed in 
monetary compensation to the African American nation? Japanese 
Americans unjustly interned during World War II received 
20,000 USD per person (either the victims themselves, or direct 
descendants) from the United States Treasury. A twofold 
compensation would seem to be a plausible minimum for the African 
Americans. According to the 2010 Census, Black Americans 
constitute 13.6 % of the American population, with 42,020,743 
individuals. In 2000, 19 out of every 20 Black Americans were 
African Americans64. We could thus loosely estimate that this 
proportion is 18 out of 20 for 2010 and calculate that African 
Americans total 37,818,669 individuals, or 12.2 % of the American 
population65. At 40,000 USD per African American, the total sum 
owed to the African American nation in compensation payments is 
1,513bn USD. This compensation represents only 0.04 % of 
authorized federal expenses in the American budget of 2012, which 
totals 3,796,000bn USD. Despite its staggering sovereign debt, the 
American nation has annual revenues more than sufficient 
(2,469,000bn USD in 2012) to pay for such compensation. If need 
be, the compensation could be paid in annual transfers over a few 
years. The payment of such monetary compensation would be a 
further proof of the seriousness of the reconciliation process. 
______________ 
62 Monetary compensations never equate the wrongs suffered and never can 
they make up completely for them or absolve their perpetrators. Money and 
dignity are incommensurable kinds. 
63 Boxill, B. (2011), “Black Reparations”, p. 39. 
64 Berlin, I. (2010), The Making of African America: The Four Great Migrations, 
p. 7. 
65 Rastogi, S., T. D. Johnson, E. M. Hoeffel, et M. P. Drewery, Jr. (2011), 
The Black Population. 
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Second, the African American nation could demand the 
institutional recognition as a minority nation in the context of a 
plurinational American society, and of its fundamental collective right 
to internal self-determination. Without neither ancestral land to claim, 
nor geographical concentration, the African American nation cannot 
demand exclusive use over a distinct territory. However, the 
recognition of the right to internal self-determination does not 
require a transfer of territory. Given the non-geographical basis of 
African American national identity, and its compatibility with a plural 
national identity, such a demand appears unlikely. 
According to Michel Seymour’s theory of institutional recognition 
of national primary groups66, the fundamental collective right to 
internal self-determination is best understood as a sufficient ground 
for four types of claims: 1) claim to fair representation in the relevant 
political and legal institutions of the plurinational society; 2) claim to 
political autonomy in the form of a devolution of powers (legislative, 
executive, legal and administrative); 3) claim to a duly recognized 
differentiated institutional status; and finally 4) claim to obtain 
targeted and specific rights within the plurinational association, which 
are to be settled through a deliberation process67. This fourth and last 
claim is the ultimate consequence of the principle of self-
determination according to which nations ought to govern 
themselves. It allows nations to identify targeted and specific rights 
necessary to the preservation and flourishing of their national 
identity, culture and sometimes specific language. These rights are 
deemed specific because they are those of a particular nation, due to its 
particular and sometimes unique characteristics. They are deemed 
targeted because they grant an enhanced autonomy in specific 
legislative areas, or an enhanced representation in specific decision-
making bodies of the plurinational society.  
Third and last, another plausible demand could be voiced by the 
African American nation. It is the proposition put forward by Roy L. 
______________ 
66 National groups which are geographically distinct but also are culturally 
(or otherwise relevantly) similar fragments of a national primary group – 
such as diasporas – are to be distinguished from national primary groups, 
and cannot make claims of internal self-determination. 
67 Seymour, M. (2008), De la tolérance à la reconnaissance. Une théorie libérale des 
droits collectifs. 
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Brooks, who suggests a limited separation policy for African 
American and American communities68. This suggestion is justified 
by the existence of a latent racism which, according to the author, 
impedes racial integration and thus maintains a de facto segregation, 
albeit a moderate one compared to the post-Jim Crow era. The 
socioeconomic segregation of African Americans is well documented, 
in various areas such as education, housing, employment, voting, 
health and criminality. This multifaceted disparity is enduring despite 
well-intended legislative efforts of integration, and it adds to the 
succession of historical injustices suffered by the African American 
nation. Limited separation is thought to be able to circumvent latent 
racism and to substantiate self-determination. In the words of 
Brooks: 
[…] limited separation is voluntary racial isolation that 
serves to support and nurture individuals within the group 
without unnecessarily trammeling the interests of other 
individuals or groups. Racial isolation that results in a 
conscious choice or strategy of self-support by African 
Americans and that does not unnecessarily subordinate 
whites individually or collectively is what I mean by limited 
separation. [...] This policy is not, however, intended to 
supersede racial integration. Rather, it is designed to 
temper racial integration’s tendency to place policy before 
people. [...] Racial integration and limited separation should 
be viewed as different paths to racial equality69. 
Brooks states three conditions jointly necessary to justify a limited 
separation policy70. First, it must be possible to show that a 
systematic discrimination disadvantages or harms members of the 
group. Second, institutions created by the limited separation policy 
must not reproduce discrimination based on nationality or ethnic 
origin – but only reversed. They must be moderately inclusive and 
shun discriminatory practices. Third, the only exceptions to the 
interdiction of discrimination must be justified by practices which are 
______________ 
68 Brooks, R. L. (1996), Integration or Separation? A Strategy for Racial Equality. 
69 Ibid., p. 190. 
70 Ibid., p. 191-192. 
Simon Guertin‐Armstrong 
 48 
instrumental to the objective of allowing the discriminated 
community to thrive and flourish. Whether by itself or in conjunction 
with other approaches, limited separation could level the playing field 
for African Americans and make progress toward equality of 
opportunity in the plurinational American society. Brooks suggestion 
bears further relevance in the light of the fragmented geographical 
repartition of the members of the African American nation. This 
translates into a difficulty for them to demand political autonomy, 
which only geographically concentrated minority nations can claim 
coherently. 
This brief list of possible demands of reparations for past wrongs 
to the African American nation is of course non-exhaustive, and is 
exploratory in nature. It aims to show that there is a wealth of 
possible claims which could be voiced in the political process of 
reconciliation of the nations that form the plurinational American 
society, and of restoration of moral relations between nations, 
grounded on the recognition of cultural differences and of moral 
equality. 
Conclusion 
This paper proposes a theory of historical justice limited to 
transgenerational collective agents inspired by Janna Thompson’s 
account. By clarifying fundamental matters of social ontology, 
collective agency, collective moral responsibility and the nature of 
nationhood relevant to historical justice between groups, it aims to 
overcome the difficulties faced by Thompson’s argument. Applying 
this theory to the case of African Americans serves both as a test for 
the theory’s viability to tackle real-world cases of historical injustice 
and as a substantial argument, concluding that reparations are owed 
to the African American nation. In doing so, the argument answers 
classical objections according to which African Americans do not 
constitute a nation, hence there is no basis for reparation since they 
have never possessed any property titles as slaves. 
Two important obstacles must be overcome to render reparations 
to African Americans tangible. First, the public recognition of the 
African American nation requires a reconceptualization of the 
American polity. White Americans generally represent themselves as 
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a homogenous society due to the “melting pot” assimilation policy, 
and as a virtuous and morally exemplary society due to the doctrine 
of American exceptionalism. This collective representation must 
nevertheless be redefined to make way for the recognition of the 
African Americans and Native Indians as nations part of a plurinational 
polity, and for the recognition of past injustices. Demographics, which 
predict Latino Americans will be the largest ethnolinguistic group in 
the United States in 2050 due to an impressive population growth 
rate, will in time sound the death knell for the homogenous, 
mononational, exceptionalist conception of the American polity. 
Second, even though it has been established that the African 
American nation is worthy of respect and that it can rightfully claim 
reparations for historical wrongs, it must become minimally 
organized in order to deliberate over proper reparations and to voice its 
deliberated demands. It is possible for a nation to organize, even 
without a government, through local and national associations 
empowered to represent the nation. The National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People, founded in 1909, could be in the position 
to exert influence in this respect and to build a polity-wide liberal 
nationalist movement – and, eventually, organization.  
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